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Abstract
An important question in economics is how people choose between different payments in the
future. The classical normative model predicts that a decision maker discounts a later payment
relative to an earlier one by an exponential function of the time between them. Descriptive
models use non-exponential functions to fit observed behavioral phenomena, such as preference
reversal. Here we propose a model of discounting, consistent with standard axioms of choice,
in which decision makers maximize the growth rate of their wealth. Four specifications of the
model produce four forms of discounting – no discounting, exponential, hyperbolic, and a hybrid
of exponential and hyperbolic – two of which predict preference reversal. Our model requires
no assumption of behavioral bias or payment risk.
Keywords: decision theory, temporal discounting, ergodicity economics
JEL codes: D8, D9
∗London Mathematical Laboratory, a.adamou@lml.org.uk
†London Mathematical Laboratory, y.berman@lml.org.uk
‡Universite´ Paris-Dauphine, diomides.mavroyiannis@dauphine.eu
§London Mathematical Laboratory and Santa Fe Institute, o.peters@lml.org.uk
¶We wish to thank Ryan Singer for insightful discussions that led to an early outline for this manuscript.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
02
13
7v
2 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  1
0 O
ct 
20
19
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In economics and psychology, temporal discounting – or, simply, discounting – is a paradigm of
how decision makers choose between rewards available at different times in the future. We write
here of people and money payments, noting that discounting is also studied in other animals and
for other reward types. The basic observation to be explained is this: for two payments of equal
size, people prefer typically the earlier payment to the later one. In the discounting paradigm, the
later payment is discounted relative to the earlier payment by multiplying it by a function of the
time period between the payments, called the delay. This operation expresses the later payment
as an equivalent payment at the earlier time, to be compared with the earlier payment actually on
offer.
Why do people assign lower values to payments further in the future? One plausible answer is
that a later payment is less likely to be received, because there is more time for something to go
wrong with it. In other words, delay increases risk. Another is that, for equal payments, the later
one corresponds to a lower growth rate which, if sustained over time, would result in being poorer.
Modern treatments of discounting in economics tend to follow risk-based reasoning, while there is
a more even split between risk and rate interpretations in psychology.
This paper studies the microfoundations of discounting using the rate interpretation in a riskless
setting. In our model, a decision maker chooses between two known and different payments to
be received at known and different times, such that the growth rate of her wealth is maximized.
Our model assumes no behavioral bias and does not violate standard axioms of choice. It predicts
a range of situation-dependent discount functions, including those documented in the discounting
literature.
This literature abounds with models (Cohen et al., 2019). In some, theoretical considerations are
used to construct the decision maker’s maximand, from which the discount function is derived.
Such models are “normative” in that they say what a decision maker should do if she wants to act
optimally in the sense specified. In other models, the discount function is chosen to fit empirical
data, with theoretical justification sought post hoc or not at all. These models are “descriptive” in
that they predict what decision makers actually do, regardless of whether it is in any sense optimal.
The main normative model in economics is exponential discounting, in which the discount function
decays exponentially with the delay (Samuelson, 1937). For money payments, this is derived
straightforwardly: either by a no-arbitrage argument, assuming payments are guaranteed and the
earlier payment can be invested during the delay to earn compound interest at a riskless rate; or
by assuming the later payment has a constant hazard rate during the delay and the decision maker
maximizes the expected payment (Kacelnik, 1997).
Exponential discounting is not descriptive. Experiments on human and non-human animals suggest
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that payments can be discounted more for shorter delays and less for longer delays than is well
described by fitting the rate parameter of an exponential function. Furthermore, subjects exhibit
a behavior known as preference reversal, where they switch from preferring the later to the earlier
payment as time passes. Specifically, the switch happens as the time to the earlier payment – which
we call the horizon – gets shorter, while the delay between the payments stays the same (Keren and
Roelofsma, 1995, p. 288). Preference reversal is never predicted by standard exponential discounting
(Green and Myerson, 1996, Fig 2). The primary evidence against the main normative model is
summarized by Myerson and Green (1995) and references therein. In response to its falsification,
descriptive models are proposed with discount functions better able to fit observations.
A widely-used descriptive model is hyperbolic discounting, where the discount function is a hy-
perbola in the delay. The function has one free parameter, known as the degree of discounting,
which determines its steepness. Fitting this parameter to experimental data is more efficient than
fitting an exponential function, both at group level and for individuals (Myerson and Green, 1995).
Furthermore, preference reversal is compatible with this model (Green and Myerson, 1996, Fig. 2).
Kacelnik (1997) remarks on this divergence between normative and descriptive models, noting that
the hyperbola “is not strongly explanatory because it did not emerge from an a priori analysis but
purely from its power to describe data efficiently. In contrast, because of the strong appeal of the a
priori argument favoring exponential discounting, several re-elaborations have been made to rescue
the rationale that led to it.”1 Most such attempts to adapt the normative model introduce payment
uncertainty, which we discuss in Sec. 1.3. Another approach, favored in behavioral economics, is to
present non-exponential discounting as a cognitive bias – a deviation from optimal behavior – to be
documented and quantified in mathematical functions that encode human psychology (Loewenstein
and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997).
1.2 Our model – growth rate maximization
Here we propose a model of temporal discounting compatible with hyperbolic discounting, in which
neither payment risk nor behavioral bias are assumed. We study the basic temporal choice problem
in which a decision maker must choose between two known, certain, and different payments to be
made at known, certain, and different future times. In our model, she does so by comparing the
growth rates of wealth associated with each option.
The temporal choice problem is underspecified. We specify it fully by introducing: the wealth
dynamics, treating specifically additive and multiplicative cases; and the time frame of the decision,
meaning the period over which it is appropriate to compute growth rates.
Depending on the specification, our model predicts four different forms of discounting: no discount-
1Said succinctly, a normative-only model provides rationale without fit, and a descriptive-only model provides
fit without rationale. Ideally, models of discounting, as of other behavioral phenomena, would provide both and the
distinction would be redundant.
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ing; exponential; hyperbolic; and a hybrid of exponential and hyperbolic. This is not an exhaustive
list – other dynamics would produce other forms of discounting. Two of the discount functions
nested in our model, hyperbolic and hybrid, are compatible with preference reversal.
The hybrid discount function depends not only on the delay and the horizon, but also on the decision
maker’s wealth and underlying growth rate. This produces a richer set of predicted behaviors than
other specifications. One prediction is that decision makers can switch from preferring the earlier
to the later payment as their wealth increases. In other words, richer people discount less steeply,
consistent with empirical findings (Green et al., 1996; Epper et al., 2018). Another prediction is
that, for small payments, discounting is close to hyperbolic for short delays and close to exponential
for long delays.
The main contribution of this paper is the prediction of non-exponential discounting and preference
reversal in a normative model that does not violate standard axioms of choice (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). Our model assumes neither bias nor dynamic inconsistency (Cohen et al.,
2019, p. 3) in the decision maker’s behavior. At all times she prefers the option with the highest
growth rate. In some specifications this translates into a reversal of preference between payments
(not growth rates). In our perspective this reflects a change of circumstances and not of mind. The
fundamental preference – for faster growth – never reverses.
Moreover, this paper marks a shift from psychological to circumstantial explanations of discounting.
We predict that changes in the discount function arise from changes in wealth dynamics and time
frame, which are properties not of the decision maker but of her circumstances. When these
circumstances are included in the formalism, a single behavioral model – a single maximand – is
capable of predicting a range of observed behaviors. Since psychological risk preferences, encoded
in idiosyncratic utility functions, do not appear in our model, we sidestep recent controversy in
the literature about the suitability of experiments involving money payments to test models of
utility-of-consumption flows (Cohen et al., 2019). Such experiments are able to falsify our model
and are planned.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the temporal choice problem and our decision
model. In Sec. 3 we present different specifications of the problem and describe how a decision
maker discounts future payments in each of them. We conclude in Sec. 4.
1.3 Related literature
This paper follows the tradition of adapting the normative discounting model to make it consistent
with observations, i.e. to make it descriptive (Kacelnik, 1997). Our strategy is to postulate the
growth rate of wealth as the decision maker’s maximand. Computing this requires information
about wealth dynamics and time frame, about which the basic temporal choice problem is silent.
Another strategy is to leave the maximand – usually an expected payment or utility gain – un-
changed and introduce uncertainty in the amount or timing of the payment. The uncertainty is
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chosen so that the effective discount function takes a form known to fit the data. Adding risk can
be viewed as another way of resolving the underspecification of the temporal choice problem. This
approach is questionable because, whereas dynamics are unspecified in the problem, uncertainty is
explicitly absent – a choice between certain payments at certain times. Payment risk is a sound
microfoundation when the uncertainty absent from the problem formulation is important in reality.
Such situations are plausible and likely widespread. For example, a predator declining a small but
readily-caught prey to search for something more filling risks catching nothing at all. However,
adding payment uncertainty to generate, say, hyperbolic discounting is not a general prescription.
It fails when the real payment risk is negligible, as envisaged in the problem and presented in
experiments, e.g. (Myerson and Green, 1995).
Furthermore, to recover the hyperbola as the discount function, specific forms of uncertainty or
other adaptations are required. Green and Myerson (1996) point out that an expected payment
model (‘risk neutrality’) with a hyperbolic hazard rate predicts hyperbolic discounting. They note
also that the exponential function can be made consistent with observed behavior, including pref-
erence reversal, by allowing its rate parameter to vary with payment size. Sozou (1998) treats an
expected payment model with an uncertain hazard rate, about which the decision maker learns
through Bayesian updating. If the prior distribution of the hazard rate is exponential, then hyper-
bolic discounting is again obtained. Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) also assume risk neutrality but
keep the hazard rate constant. To recover hyperbolic discounting they introduce the possibility of
payment occurring before the anticipated time.
Such adaptations lead to a loss of generality. They make statements of the type: ‘if there is
uncertainty in a future payment, and if it takes this specific form, then the discount function is a
hyperbola.’ Such ad hoc assumptions reduce the generality of risk-based models further, since they
are useful only when the real risk is of a particular nature.
The strategy we follow leaves payment certainty alone and changes the maximand. It is long estab-
lished in biology and psychology that hyperbolic discounting is consistent with maximizing the rate
of change of resources in a model of additive payments. This insight, traced back to the predation
model of Holling (1959), is recognized in studies of human discounting (Myerson and Green, 1995;
Kacelnik, 1997; Sozou, 1998). Kacelnik (1997, Fig. 2) offers a pictorial representation, similar to
ours in Sec. 3, of how rate maximization predicts preference reversal. In the rate interpretation,
the degree of discounting is no longer a free psychological parameter. Rather it is constrained to
be the reciprocal of the horizon (Myerson and Green, 1995). This is a testable prediction.
This paper extends this strand of the literature by setting the decision maker’s maximand as the
growth rate of resources under general dynamics. We generalize further by allowing the time frame
of the decision – over which growth rates are computed – to be the period from the decision to either
the chosen or the later payment. This captures circumstances akin to opportunity costs, specifically
whether accepting the earlier payment frees the decision maker to pursue other payments.
Our work contributes to the growing field of ergodicity economics (Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016;
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Berman, Peters and Adamou, 2017; Peters and Adamou, 2018) in which decision makers max-
imize the long-time growth rate of resources, rather than expectation values of psychologically-
transformed resource flows (under, in prospect theory, psychologically-transformed probability
measures). This study joins recent evidence of strong dependence on wealth dynamics of human
decisions under uncertainty (Meder et al., 2019) and may be used to design similar experiments
without uncertainty.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Problem definition
We begin by formalizing a basic riskless temporal choice problem, where discounting is used to
express a later payment as an equivalent payment at an earlier time. We define a Riskless In-
tertemporal Payment Problem (RIPP):
Definition 1. Riskless Intertemporal Payment Problem.
A Riskless Intertemporal Payment Problem (RIPP) is a vector {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tb,∆xb}. A de-
cision maker at time t0 with wealth x (t0) must choose between two future cash payments, whose
amounts and payment times are known with certainty. The two options are:
a. an earlier payment of ∆xa at time ta > t0; and
b. a later payment of ∆xb at time tb > ta.
A criterion for choosing a or b is required. Here we explore what happens if that criterion is
maximization of the growth rate of wealth, i.e. if a is chosen when it corresponds to a higher
growth rate of the decision maker’s wealth than b, and vice versa.
A growth rate is defined as the scale parameter of time in the growth function of wealth subject to
dynamics. Dynamics can take different forms, each corresponding to a different form of growth rate.
We treat explicitly multiplicative and additive dynamics (Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016), noting that
more general dynamics can be treated similarly (Peters and Adamou, 2018).
Multiplicative dynamics
Ignoring, for the moment, payments ∆xa and ∆xb, a common assumption is that wealth grows
exponentially in time at rate r. We label this dynamic as multiplicative. It corresponds to investing
wealth in income-generating assets, where the income is proportional to the amount invested.
Wealth grows as
x (t) = x (t0) e
r(t−t0) , (2.1)
and the scale parameter of time in the exponential function is r. r resembles an interest rate or a
rate of return on investment.
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Additive dynamics
Another possibility is additive dynamics, where wealth grows linearly in time at a rate k. This
resembles saved labor income or, more generally, situations where investment income is negligible
and wealth changes by net flows that do not depend on wealth itself. In this case wealth grows as
x (t) = x (t0) + k (t− t0) , (2.2)
and the scale parameter of time in the linear function is k.
The functional form of the growth rate differs between the dynamics. The growth rate between
time t and t+∆t can be extracted from the expression for the evolution of wealth over that period.
Under multiplicative dynamics it is
r =
log x (t+ ∆t)− log x (t)
∆t
, (2.3)
and under additive dynamics it is
k =
x (t+ ∆t)− x (t)
∆t
. (2.4)
The matching of growth rate with dynamics is crucial. An additive growth rate applied to wealth
following a multiplicative process would vary with time, as would a multiplicative growth rate
applied to additively-growing wealth. The correct growth rate extracts a stable parameter from
the dynamics, allowing processes with the same type of dynamics to be compared.
Given the wealth dynamics, a RIPP implies two growth rates: ga, associated with option a; and
gb, associated with option b. This permits a single choice axiom:
Axiom 1. The Maximization of Growth.
Given the wealth dynamics, a decision time t0, an initial wealth x (t0), and payments a ≡ (ta,∆xa)
and b ≡ (tb,∆xb), such that the vector {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tb,∆xb} is a RIPP:
1. a  b [‘a is preferred to b’] if and only if ga > gb
2. a ∼ b [‘indifference between a and b’] if and only if ga = gb
3. a ≺ b [‘b is preferred to a’] if and only if ga < gb
In words, Axiom 1 states that a decision maker prefers option a if her wealth grows faster under
this choice than under option b, and vice versa. She is indifferent if the growth rates are equal.
Axiom 1 satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms: completeness is satisfied by design, while
continuity and independence are irrelevant, since in this setup all the payments and times are
certain. It also satisfies transitivity (see proof in Appendix A).
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2.2 Model setup
Figure 1 illustrates a RIPP, corresponding to the basic question that arises in temporal discounting,
e.g. ‘would you prefer to receive $100 tomorrow or $200 in a month’s time?’ Growth rates depend on
time increments, not times themselves, so it is useful to define the two fundamental time increments
in the problem: the period from the decision to the earlier payment, called the horizon,
H ≡ ta − t0 ; (2.5)
and the period between the payments, called the delay,
D ≡ tb − ta . (2.6)
The discount function is a function of the delay. It is the multiplicative factor which, when applied
to the later payment, renders the decision maker indifferent, i.e.
δ (D) ≡ ∆xa
∆xb
∣∣∣∣
a∼b
. (2.7)
Depending on the model specification, the discount function can also vary with other variables in
the problem, such as the horizon, payment sizes, initial wealth, and underlying growth rate (r or k
for the dynamics we study).
Time
Wealth
t0 ta tb
x (t0)
x (t0) + ∆xa
x (t0) + ∆xb
Horizon, H Delay, D
Figure 1: The basic setup of the model. A decision maker faces a choice at time t0 between option
a, which guarantees a payment of ∆xa at time ta, and option b, which guarantees a payment of
∆xb > ∆xa at time tb > ta. We define the time between the decision and the earlier payment as
the horizon, H ≡ ta − t0; and the time between the two payments as the delay, D ≡ tb − ta.
Despite its apparent simplicity, solving the temporal choice problem requires additional assump-
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tions. In our model, two assumptions are needed. The first concerns the dynamics under which
the decision maker’s wealth grows, as discussed in Sec. 2.1. This determines the appropriate form
of the growth rate. The second assumption concerns what we call the time frame of the decision,
specifically whether a decision maker accepting the earlier payment at ta is free immediately to
make her next decision, or whether she must wait until the later time tb. This determines the
appropriate time period for computing the growth rate under each option. Full specification allows
the decision maker’s maximand – the growth rate of her wealth – to be evaluated and her options
compared. For concreteness we confine our attention to ∆xb > ∆xa, which is the most commonly
considered dilemma.
We describe four different specifications of this basic setup. In each we calculate the growth rates
of wealth, ga and gb, associated with options a and b. From this analysis we infer the discount
function as
δ (D) ≡ ∆xa
∆xb
∣∣∣∣
ga=gb
, (2.8)
i.e. the ratio of earlier to later payment under the constraint that the growth rates corresponding
to each are equal. The four specifications predict four forms of discounting – no discounting,
exponential, hyperbolic, and a hybrid of exponential and hyperbolic – and, in some cases, preference
reversal.
3 Results
3.1 Specification
We begin by describing the four different model specifications. Each specifies two aspects necessary
to quantify the growth rate of wealth: the time frame of the decision; and the dynamics under
which wealth evolves.
Time frame
The time frame is a key aspect, often left unspecified or implicit in similar setups in the literature.
To illustrate it, we consider the following scenarios:
1. Denise is a day laborer. Every morning she chooses a job to take on. Jobs pay different wages
and take different amounts of time, although always less than a day. Denise is paid as soon
as she completes the job and goes home. She cannot do more than one job each day.
2. Fiona is a freelancer. She works on projects ranging from a few days to many months and
she can only work on one project at a time. As soon as she finishes a project, she gets paid
and can move on to the next project.
In the first scenario, the important element to note is that no matter which choice is made, it does
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not affect the timing of future choices. Denise’s next decision is always the next morning. The time
frame is independent of the choice, so we say it is fixed.
In the second scenario, the time frame depends on the choice made. The timing of Fiona’s next
choice is determined by her current decision, e.g. choosing a shorter project frees her sooner for
the next opportunity. We call this the adaptive time frame.
In our model, we must choose the time period over which the growth rate of wealth is relevant to
the decision maker. With a fixed time frame, this is always the period between the decision and
the later payment, i.e. tb − t0 = H +D. In Denise’s case, this is a working day. With an adaptive
time frame, it is the period between the decision and the chosen payment, i.e. ta − t0 = H for
option a and tb − t0 = H +D for option b. This specification is appropriate to Fiona’s situation.
Dynamics
As described in Section 2, the wealth dynamics can also take different forms. We address two
common cases: additive and multiplicative wealth dynamics. We note that under the multiplicative
dynamics it is assumed that the payment itself is reinvested at the risk-free rate. For additive
dynamics there is essentially no reinvestment of the payment. Income in this dynamic is independent
of wealth.
We discuss the four specifications, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In each case we: compute the growth
rates ga and gb associated with each option; compare them to determine the conditions under which
each option is preferred; determine whether preference reversal is predicted; and, finally, elicit the
form of temporal discounting equivalent to our decision model.
Fixed Adaptive
TIME FRAME
Additive
Multiplicative
Additive
Multiplicative
DYNAMICS
A B C D
Figure 2: The four model specifications, determined by specifying a time frame and wealth dynam-
ics. The labels A, B, C, and D, are used for the different cases.
9
3.2 Case A – Fixed time frame with additive dynamics
Specification: the period for computing the growth rate is that between the decision and the later
payment, tb− t0 = H +D; and wealth dynamics are additive. Here, regardless of the initial wealth
and in addition to the chosen payment, wealth grows at an additive rate k (corresponding, for
example, to labor income).
We begin by writing down the final wealth under each of the two options, evaluated at tb:
xa (tb) = x (t0) + k (tb − t0) + ∆xa ; (3.1)
xb (tb) = x (t0) + k (tb − t0) + ∆xb . (3.2)
The growth rates are:
ga =
xa (tb)− x (t0)
tb − t0 =
∆xa
H +D
+ k ; (3.3)
gb =
xb (tb)− x (t0)
tb − t0 =
∆xb
H +D
+ k . (3.4)
Since ∆xb > ∆xa, option b is always preferred to option a. This is a trivial case: under additive
wealth dynamics and comparing growth rates over the same time period, only payment size matters.
There is no discounting and the discount function δ is undefined, because the indifference condition
is never satisfied.
3.3 Case B – Fixed time frame with multiplicative dynamics
Specification: the period for computing the growth rate is that between the decision and the later
payment, tb − t0 = H +D; and wealth dynamics are multiplicative. This specification corresponds
to the classical temporal discounting, where wealth compounds continuously at the risk-free rate,
r, and payments are reinvested at this rate.
We note that in this case the earlier payment, ∆xa, if chosen, is treated as growing exponentially
from its receipt at ta to tb. The wealths evolve from t0 to tb as follows:
xa (tb) = x (t0) e
r(tb−t0) + ∆xaer(tb−ta) ; (3.5)
xb (tb) = x (t0) e
r(tb−t0) + ∆xb . (3.6)
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The corresponding growth rates are:
ga =
log xa (tb)− log x (t0)
tb − t0 =
1
H +D
log
(
1 +
∆xae
rD
x (t0) er(H+D)
)
+ r ; (3.7)
gb =
log xb (tb)− log x (t0)
tb − t0 =
1
H +D
log
(
1 +
∆xb
x (t0) er(H+D)
)
+ r . (3.8)
The criterion ga > gb is simple. Only the numerator in the second term of the logarithm is different,
so only this must be compared. Thus, ga > gb if
∆xae
rD > ∆xb . (3.9)
We see that the decision criterion depends on a single time period, the delay, and on the underlying
growth rate of wealth. The discount function is obtained by setting the growth rates to be equal,
which happens when ∆xae
rD = ∆xb. This yields
δ (D; r) =
∆xa
∆xb
∣∣∣∣
ga=gb
= e−rD , (3.10)
which is the classical exponential discounting result (Samuelson, 1937).2 The interpretation is
straightforward: if it is possible to reinvest the earlier payment such that it will exceed the later
payment amount at the later payment time, then option a is preferred to option b (and vice versa).
3.4 Case C – Adaptive time frame with additive dynamics
Specification: the period for computing the growth rate is that between the decision and the chosen
payment, either ta− t0 = H or tb− t0 = H +D; and wealth dynamics are additive. Like in case A,
regardless of the initial wealth and in addition to the chosen payment, wealth grows at an additive
rate k. Unlike case A, options a and b are evaluated at ta and tb, respectively:
xa (ta) = x (t0) + k (ta − t0) + ∆xa ; (3.11)
xb (tb) = x (t0) + k (tb − t0) + ∆xb . (3.12)
The growth rates are:
ga =
xa (ta)− x (t0)
ta − t0 =
∆xa
H
+ k ; (3.13)
gb =
xb (tb)− x (t0)
tb − t0 =
∆xb
H +D
+ k . (3.14)
2Indeed, this result corresponds to the historical use of the term “rate of discount” to describe a risk-free interest
rate in the money market, e.g. (Jevons, 1863).
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It follows that the criterion ga > gb is
∆xa
H
>
∆xb
H +D
. (3.15)
So, in this specification, the decision maker cares about the linear payment rate under each option.
Preference reversals are observed changes in decisions as time passes, i.e. as the horizon gets shorter.
We can test whether they are predicted in our model by varying H while holding other variables
constant. In the present specification, indifference occurs at the horizon for which Eq. (3.15)
becomes an equality, i.e. at H = HPR where
HPR ≡ D∆xa
∆xb −∆xa . (3.16)
Since t0 = ta −H, this can be expressed as a critical decision time at which the decision maker is
indifferent:
tPR0 ≡ ta −HPR =
∆xbta −∆xatb
∆xb −∆xa . (3.17)
For H < HPR (t0 > t
PR
0 ), the payment rate under option a exceeds that under option b and the
earlier payment is preferred. The converse is true for H > HPR (t0 < t
PR
0 ). Fig. 3 illustrates how
the dependence of payment rate on horizon leads to preference reversal under additive dynamics
with an adaptive time frame, c.f. (Kacelnik, 1997, Fig. 2).
H D H D H D
Figure 3: Preference reversal in case C. From left to right panel, t0 increases and H decreases –
i.e. both payments get closer – while all other parameters are held constant. Initially, option b is
preferred, having the higher payment rate (slope of dashed line). At the critical time, t0 = t
PR
0 ,
given by Eq. (3.17), both options imply the same payment rate. At later times, option a has the
higher payment rate and is preferred.
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Finally, we compute the discount function under this specification. When ga = gb, we have
δ (D;H) =
∆xa
∆xb
=
H
H +D
=
1
1 +D/H
. (3.18)
Thus we recover the widely-used descriptive model of discounting in which the discount function, δ,
is a hyperbola of the delay, D. We note that δ also depends on the horizon, H. Indeed, the degree
of discounting parameter – usually treated as a psychological parameter – appears in our model as
1/H, the reciprocal of the horizon (Myerson and Green, 1995). As the horizon gets shorter, 1/H
becomes larger, δ gets smaller, and the later payment becomes less favorable. No knowledge of the
decision maker’s psychology is required in this setup, only the postulate that she prefers her wealth
to grow faster rather than slower.
Finally, we note that k, the underlying growth rate of the decision maker’s wealth, does not appear
in the decision criterion. This is because wealth growth is not affected by exogenous cash flows under
additive dynamics: the gain k∆t over period ∆t occurs regardless of other payments received. This
contrasts with multiplicative dynamics, where early payments are subjected to the growth process
through reinvestment.
3.5 Case D – Adaptive time frame with multiplicative dynamics
Specification: the period for computing the growth rate is that between the decision and the chosen
payment, either ta − t0 = H or tb − t0 = H +D; and wealth dynamics are multiplicative.
We follow the same steps as in the previous cases. Wealth evolves to:
xa (ta) = x (t0) e
r(ta−t0) + ∆xa ; (3.19)
xb (tb) = x (t0) e
r(tb−t0) + ∆xb . (3.20)
The corresponding growth rates are:
ga =
log xa (ta)− log x (t0)
ta − t0 =
1
H
log
(
1 +
∆xa
x (t0) erH
)
+ r ; (3.21)
gb =
log xb (tb)− log x (t0)
tb − t0 =
1
H +D
log
(
1 +
∆xb
x (t0) er(H+D)
)
+ r . (3.22)
Preference reversal
When the later payment is sufficiently large, ∆xb > ∆xae
rD, preference reversal is predicted,3 and
a threshold horizon, HPR, exists. For shorter horizons than HPR, the earlier payment is preferred
(ga > gb) and vice versa. The discount function and threshold horizon are not expressible in closed
form for general parameter values. They become tractable in the limit of small payments, which
3This can be shown by comparing the H → 0 and H →∞ limits of ga and gb in Eq. (3.21) and Eq. (3.22).
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we present below. If the later payment is too small, ∆xb < ∆xae
rD, the earlier payment is always
preferred in this specification.
Wealth effect
Our model predicts another type of preference reversal here, elicited by varying the initial wealth,
x (t0), rather than the horizon. As x (t0) → 0, the earlier payment is preferred regardless of the
size of the later payment. If the later payment is large enough, specifically if
∆xb > ∆xae
rD
(
H +D
H
)
, (3.23)
then it becomes preferable to the earlier payment as x (t0)→∞. Thus, the decision maker switches
from preferring earlier to later payments as her wealth increases. We label this the wealth effect.
It is illustrated pictorially in Fig. 4, which shows the variation of growth rates, ga and gb, for each
option as initial wealth, x (t0), increases from left to right. Other parameters are held constant.
H D H D H D
Figure 4: Wealth effect in case D, with logarithmic vertical scales. Initial wealth x (t0) increases
from left panel to right panel ($500, $2277, $5500) with all other parameters held fixed (t0 = today,
ta = 1 year from today, tb = 2 years from today, ∆xa = $1000, ∆xb = $2500, r = 0.03 per annum).
At small wealth, option a is preferred, having the higher growth rate according to Eq. (3.21) and
Eq. (3.22). At a larger wealth, x (t0)
PR ≈ $2277, both options imply equal growth, with preference
reversal occurring as wealth increases further.
Figure 5 shows the difference in growth rates, ga − gb, as a function of initial wealth, x (t0), for
the same parameters as in Fig. 4. The earlier payment is preferred when this difference is positive,
which happens for wealth below some threshold. For larger wealth, the growth rate difference is
negative and the later payment is chosen.
We interpret this as follows. Assuming multiplicative dynamics and an adaptive time frame, it
is growth-optimal for people of lower wealth to choose an earlier, smaller payment; and growth-
optimal for wealthier individuals to hold out for the later, larger payment. This is consistent
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Figure 5: The difference in growth rates, ga − gb, as a function of initial wealth, x (t0), in case D.
For small initial wealth the earlier, smaller payment is preferred, whereas for large initial wealth
the later, larger payment is preferred. Parameters as used in Fig. 4.
with the findings of Epper et al. (2018), that “individuals with relatively low time discounting are
consistently positioned higher in the wealth distribution.” It is likely consistent with (Green et al.,
1996), in which people with higher incomes were observed to discount less steeply.
We exemplify the wealth effect by presenting a calculation using the same parameters as in Fig. 4.
Suppose a decision maker faces a choice between receiving $1000 after one year (option a) or $2500
after two years (option b), and that she has access to a risk-free interest rate of 0.03 per annum. If
she has $500 initially, she evaluates the growth rate corresponding to option a as
ga =
1
1
log
(
1 +
1000
500e0.03×1
)
+ 0.03 ≈ 1.1 per annum , (3.24)
and to option b as
gb =
1
2
log
(
1 +
2500
500e0.03×2
)
+ 0.03 ≈ 0.9 per annum . (3.25)
Thus, the decision maker would prefer the earlier, smaller payment, as 1.1 > 0.9. If we assume that
the decision maker had initially $5500, i.e., 11 times more than in the previous setting, a similar
calculation yields ga ≈ 0.19 and gb ≈ 0.21, so the later, larger payment is preferred.
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Discounting in the small payment limit
In many applications of discounting, it is plausible to assume that the payments are small relative
to wealth:
∆xa  x (t0) erH ; (3.26)
∆xb  x (t0) er(H+D) . (3.27)
We can express the threshold horizon and the discount function in closed form in this limit. Setting
ga = gb and using the first-order approximation log(1 + ) ≈  for  1, we get
HPR ≡ D∆xae
rD
∆xb −∆xaerD , (3.28)
and
δ (D;H; r) =
∆xa
∆xb
∣∣∣∣
ga=gb
≈ He
rH
(H +D) er(H+D)
=
e−rD
1 +D/H
, (3.29)
which is a product of hyperbolic and exponential discount functions. This hybrid case has inter-
esting behavior in the long- and short-delay limits. As shown in Fig. 6, discounting is close to
hyperbolic for short delays and to exponential for long delays. Thus, for the same dynamic and the
same time frame, and assuming small payments relative to initial wealth, our choice axiom predicts
both hyperbolic and exponential discounting, depending on the delay.
4 Discussion
This paper explores temporal discounting under the postulate that decision makers maximize the
growth rate of their wealth. We consider a basic temporal choice problem between two known,
certain, and different payments at known, certain, and different future times. To compute growth
rates, the problem must be further specified. We add information about wealth dynamics, treating
additive and multiplicative cases, and the time frame of the decision, meaning the period over
which growth is evaluated.
Preference reversal is an observed behavior in which decision makers switch from preferring later to
earlier payments as time passes. It is incompatible with the classical normative model of exponential
discounting. Our model generates four different forms of discounting, depending on the decision
maker’s circumstances – no discounting, exponential, hyperbolic, and a hybrid of exponential and
hyperbolic. The hyperbolic and hybrid forms predict preference reversal without, as is commonly
needed, assumptions of behavioral bias or payment risk.
The hybrid case – corresponding to multiplicative dynamics and an adaptive time frame – suggests
another type of preference reversal, called the wealth effect. Here a decision maker switches from
an earlier to a later payment as her wealth increases. In other words, richer people discount less
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Figure 6: The discount function in the small payment limit in case D. The solid black curve is
the hybrid δ = e−rD/(1 + D/H), for r = 0.4 per annum and H = 0.65 years. This is close to the
hyperbolic discount function 1/(1 + D/H) (black dotted) for short delays and to the exponential
discount function e−rD (grey dashed) for long delays.
steeply than poorer people, in line with empirical findings (Green et al., 1996; Epper et al., 2018).
Our main contribution is the prediction of non-exponential discounting and preference reversal in
a model that does not violate standard axioms of choice (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
Changes in the discount function arise only from changes in wealth dynamics and time frame. This
marks a shift from psychological to circumstantial explanations of discounting. Our model assumes
no dynamic inconsistency, in that the decision maker prefers at all times the option with the highest
growth rate. If corroborated empirically, it would be both a normative and a descriptive model.
Experimental tests are feasible because the model works directly with money payments rather than
utility-of-consumption flows (Cohen et al., 2019).
The temporal choice problem we study is riskless. A planned extension of this work is to explore the
consequences for our model of payment uncertainty. Uncertainty decreases the long-time growth
rate associated with a payment (Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016). This would make a risky payment
less desirable in our model, without reference to the risk preferences of the decision maker.
The dynamics discussed here do not cover the entire range of wealth dynamics. Although mul-
tiplicative and additive wealth dynamics are common and intuitive, other wealth dynamics are
possible, which would lead to other forms of discounting in our model. Our decision axiom can be
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adapted to general dynamics using the growth rates described in (Peters and Adamou, 2018).
We end with a caveat. The temporal choice problem involves two future payments. In the small
horizon limit, the growth rate corresponding to the earlier payment in the adaptive time frame
diverges. This indicates a loss of model realism. We link this to the breakdown of an implicit
assumption: that the growth rates we compute are sustained over sufficiently long periods to be
meaningful to the decision maker. They are, in effect, the growth rates of wealth achieved under
repetition of the choice. We share the view of Kacelnik (1997, p. 60) that “the discounting process
used for the one-off events seems to obey a law that evolved as an adaptation to cope with repetitive
events.” As the horizon shrinks, this imagined repetition occurs at a frequency so high that the
choice problem no longer resembles a real situation.
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A The Transitivity of Growth Rate Maximization
In this appendix we show that the maximization of growth, the single choice axiom in our model,
satisfies transitivity for all four cases described in the paper. To prove transitivity we assume
three payments, a ≡ (ta,∆xa), b ≡ (tb,∆xb) and c ≡ (tc,∆xc), where ta < tb < tc. We also
assume a decision time t0 < ta and an initial wealth x (t0). The vectors {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tb,∆xb},
{t0, x (t0) , tb,∆xb, tc,∆xc} and {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tc,∆xc} are thus RIPPs.
In each of the four cases we will show that if a ≺ b under the RIPP {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tb,∆xb} and
b ≺ c under {t0, x (t0) , tb,∆xb, tc,∆xc}, then a ≺ c under {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tc,∆xc}. We will also
show that if a ∼ b and b ∼ c, then a ∼ c.
Case A
In case A (see Sec. 3.2), we show that growth rate maximization is achieved by choosing the larger
payment. Therefore, a ≺ b iff ∆xa < ∆xb and b ≺ c iff ∆xb < ∆xc. It follows that a ≺ c because
∆xa < ∆xc. If a ∼ b and b ∼ c then ∆xa = ∆xb and ∆xb = ∆xc, so ∆xa = ∆xc and a ∼ c.
Case B
In case B (see Sec. 3.3), we show that growth rate maximization is achieved by comparing the
earlier payment to the later payment discounted by an exponential function, so
a ≺ b ⇐⇒ ∆xa < ∆xbe−r(tb−ta) ; (A.1)
b ≺ c ⇐⇒ ∆xb < ∆xce−r(tc−tb) . (A.2)
It follows that ∆xbe
−r(tb−ta) < ∆xce−r(tc−tb)e−r(tb−ta) = ∆xce−r(tc−ta), so
∆xa < ∆xce
−r(tc−ta) =⇒ a ≺ c . (A.3)
Similarly,
a ∼ b ⇐⇒ ∆xa = ∆xbe−r(tb−ta) ; (A.4)
b ∼ c ⇐⇒ ∆xb = ∆xce−r(tc−tb) . (A.5)
It follows that ∆xbe
−r(tb−ta) = ∆xce−r(tc−ta), so
∆xa = ∆xce
−r(tc−ta) =⇒ a ∼ c . (A.6)
Case C
In case C (see Sec. 3.4) only the linear payment rate of each option matters to the decision maker,
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so
a ≺ b ⇐⇒ ∆xa
ta − t0 <
∆xb
tb − t0 ; (A.7)
b ≺ c ⇐⇒ ∆xb
tb − t0 <
∆xc
tc − t0 . (A.8)
It follows that ∆xata−t0 <
∆xc
tc−t0 , and a ≺ c. Similarly,
a = b ⇐⇒ ∆xa
ta − t0 =
∆xb
tb − t0 ; (A.9)
b = c ⇐⇒ ∆xb
tb − t0 =
∆xc
tc − t0 , (A.10)
so ∆xata−t0 =
∆xc
tc−t0 , and a ∼ c.
Case D
Like in case C, the time frame in case D (see Sec. 3.5) is adaptive. For this reason the growth
rate associated with each payment depends only on the payment time and the decision time.
In other words, under both RIPPs {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tb,∆xb} and {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tc,∆xc},
the growth rate associated with payment a, ga, is the same. Similarly, gb is the same in both
{t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tb,∆xb} and {t0, x (t0) , tb,∆xb, tc,∆xc}, and gc is the same in both RIPPs
{t0, x (t0) , tb,∆xb, tc,∆xc} and {t0, x (t0) , ta,∆xa, tc,∆xc}.
It follows that
a ≺ b ⇐⇒ ga < gb ; (A.11)
b ≺ c ⇐⇒ gb < gc , (A.12)
so ga < gc, and a ≺ c. Similarly,
a ∼ b ⇐⇒ ga = gb ; (A.13)
b ∼ c ⇐⇒ gb = gc , (A.14)
so ga = gc, and a ∼ c.
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